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Mary Beth Hamel, M.D., M.P.H., Editor

Money, Sex, and Religion — The Supreme Court’s ACA Sequel
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H., Theodore W. Ruger, J.D., and Jennifer Prah Ruger, Ph.D., M.S.L.
The Supreme Court decision in the Hobby Lobby
case is in many ways a sequel to the Court’s
2012 decision on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).1,2 Like the 2012 case,
the decision was decided by a 5-to-4 vote, but in
the initial ACA decision, Chief Justice John Roberts acted to “save” the ACA.3 Not this time.
Then the watchword was “broccoli,” as in forcing people to eat it; this time it is abortion, as in
forcing employers to pay for it. To simplify, the
choice facing the Court in the Hobby Lobby case
was whether to favor the exercise of religion by
for-profit corporations (whose owners believe
contraceptives that may prevent fertilized eggs
from implanting violate their religious beliefs)
over the federal government’s attempt to create
a uniform set of health care insurance benefits.
As recommended by the Institute of Medicine
(IOM),4 such benefits include all contraceptives
approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) as preventive health care for women.
Two editorials neatly summarize the conflicting politics of the decision. According to the New
York Times, the “deeply dismaying decision . . .
swept aside accepted principles of corporate law
and religious liberty to grant owners of closely
held, for-profit companies an unprecedented
right to impose their religious views on employees . . . [by denying] thousands of women
contraceptive coverage vital to their well-being
and reproductive freedom.”5 The Wall Street Journal, on the other hand, saw the decision as “narrow [and] an important vindication of religious
liberty in this (still blessedly) pluralistic constitutional republic,” noting that “women who work
for the small number of religiously oriented
businesses will still be able to buy birth control
for as little as $9 a month.”6
The majority decision, written by Justice
Samuel Alito, is a setback for both the ACA’s
foundational goal of access to universal health
care and for women’s health care specifically. It
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is also especially worrisome that abortion is
again at the center of the continuing debate over
the implementation of the ACA and that the
challenge of abortion has been expanded to include birth control.7 This has happened even
though, in the opinion of medical experts, the
four methods of contraception under scrutiny
do not induce abortion; rather, they prevent abortion by preventing pregnancy.4,8 This controversy
could occur only because in assessing the competing claims about abortion and birth control,
the Court’s majority focused on the religious
claims of the corporations without discussing
scientific or medical opinions. As Judge Mary
Beck Briscoe observed in her dissent in the 10th
Circuit, the belief of Hobby Lobby’s owners “is
not one of religious belief but rather of purported scientific fact.”9,10

The AC A and the Religious
Freed om Re s tor ation Ac t
The ACA does not itself require insurance plans
to cover contraception but does require coverage
of four categories of preventive care without cost
sharing by patients. The fourth category covers
women’s health and requires new insurance plans
to cover “such additional preventive care and
screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)” of the
Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS).11 HRSA asked the IOM to help the agency develop this list,4 and the IOM applied neutral
scientific and medical criteria to conclude that
coverage should include the “full range” of FDAapproved contraceptive methods. HRSA adopted
this recommendation, and HHS promulgated
the contraceptive-coverage regulations, which
include 20 specific contraceptives, accordingly.12
The owners of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood Specialties objected to the inclusion of four
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of the FDA-approved contraceptives (two types
of intrauterine devices [IUDs] and the emergency contraceptives Plan B and Ella) because they
believed that these devices or drugs could induce
abortion. The Conestoga board of directors believes that “human life begins at conception,”
that it is a “sin against God” to be involved in
the “termination of a human life,” and that the
four FDA-approved contraceptives might operate
as “abortifacients.”2 Hobby Lobby’s owners similarly believe that life begins at conception and
that it would be a violation of their religion “to
facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices
that operate after that point.”2
The case centered not on a constitutional
analysis of the First Amendment but on interpreting a federal statute, the 1993 Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which states that “government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability [unless it] is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
For RFRA to be relevant, the term “person”
must include for-profit corporations. Despite the
statute’s silence on this point, and strong historical and conceptual arguments for excluding
corporations (which are artificial persons created by law and are separate and distinct from
their shareholders)13 from RFRA’s protection of
religious freedom, the majority concluded that
corporations are persons under RFRA. The majority understood that corporations are legal fictions, artificial entities created entirely by law,
but nonetheless observed that the corporation is
created to protect the rights of real people, including “shareholders, officers, and employees.”
The fact that corporations themselves cannot
exercise religion is, in the words of the majority,
“quite beside the point. Corporations ‘separate
and apart from’ the human beings who own,
run, and are employed by them cannot do anything at all.”2 This is true, but it does not explain why corporations have always been treated
in law as entities separate from their human
owners. Nonetheless, once the majority concluded that a nonprofit corporation can exercise religion, the justices could find no reason, and no
congressional intent, to exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA’s protections.
The majority also found that the contracep-
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tive-coverage regulations “substantially burden”
the corporations’ exercise of religion. This is because in order to follow their religion, the owners believed they could not offer insurance that
covered any contraceptive that “may result in
the destruction of an embryo.”2 And if they excluded these contraceptives, the “economic consequences will be severe” under the ACA.2 They
could, for example, be taxed $100 a day for each
affected individual. The corporations could also
drop insurance coverage entirely and pay less under the ACA than the cost of coverage. The majority rejected this option because the corporations
believed that providing health insurance was
also a religious obligation.

Religion and Bir th Contr ol
The majority’s finding left only two legal issues
to be decided. Does the state have a compelling
interest in ensuring that all women have access
to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost
sharing? And if so, is the regulation the “leastrestrictive means” to ensure this? The majority
assumed, without deciding, that the government’s
interest was compelling and quickly moved to
the then decisive question of whether the contraceptive mandate was the least restrictive means.
The majority’s answer was no.
The majority of the Court suggested two less
restrictive means. The first was for the federal
government to pay the cost of covering the four
contraceptives at issue. This suggestion does not
seem to be politically realistic. The second less
restrictive alternative was more serious and more
interesting. HHS regulations had already established an accommodation for nonprofit religious
corporations — namely, they can self-certify
that they have a religious objection to particular
contraceptives, and an alternative plan will be
put in place to ensure coverage to their employees without payment or other action by the objecting corporation. The majority first suggested
that this is a reasonable accommodation but
then almost immediately said it might not be
legal, thereby saving for a future date the issue
raised by the Little Sisters of the Poor who objected even to filing a certificate.14
Nonetheless, in light of the importance of
the HHS accommodation to the Court’s opinion, the three women justices were surprised
when, only 3 days after issuing the Hobby Lob-
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by decision, a majority of the Court issued an male justices did not. Justice Ginsburg began
order provisionally exempting Wheaton College her dissent by noting that the majority opinion
from the self-certifying accommodation. To do was “of startling breadth,” holding as it did that
this, the majority had to take seriously Whea- “commercial enterprises . . . can opt out of any
ton’s argument that the HHS accommodation law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible
itself violates an institution’s religious freedom with their sincerely held religious beliefs . . .
on the basis of an even more attenuated theory [without regard to the] disadvantages that reliof cause and effect than that at issue in the Hobby gion-based opt-outs impose on others.”2
Lobby case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented,
Echoing the majority’s view that the ability to
joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena form a corporation gives a person the ability to
Kagan, and rightly juxtaposed the two seemingly participate in the economic “life of the Nation,”
incongruous rulings, writing that “[t]hose who she quoted a prior decision in which the Court
are bound by our decisions usually believe they acknowledged that “the ability of women to parcan take us at our word. Not so today. After ex- ticipate equally in the economic and social life
pressly relying on the availability of the religious- of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability
nonprofit accommodation” to hold in Hobby to control their reproductive lives.” Gender
Lobby’s favor, “the Court now, as the dissent in equality in health care is what the contraceptive
Hobby Lobby feared it might . . . retreats from regulation sought to promote by putting “health
that position.” For the dissenting justices, such care decisions — including the choice among
action “evinces disregard for even the newest of contraceptive methods — in the hands of women,
this Court’s precedents and undermines confi- with the aid of their health care providers.”2
dence in this institution.”15
Justice Ginsburg was not persuaded that
Near the end of their opinion in Hobby Lobby, RFRA even applies to for-profit corporations,
the majority stated that HHS apparently believes making the point that prior to this opinion, the
that “no insurance coverage mandate would vio- Court had never recognized that a for-profit corlate RFRA . . . [even requiring, where legal] all poration could qualify for a religious objection
employers to provide coverage for . . . third- to a generally applicable law. In her view, nontrimester abortions or assisted suicide.” Since profit religious corporations can be distinguished
religious people could not do this, “HHS would from for-profit corporations because the former
effectively exclude these people from full par exist not to make money, but to serve “a comticipation in the economic life of the Nation,” by munity made up of believers in the same relieffectively precluding them from using the cor- gion.” As persuasive as her argument is about
porate form to do business.2 The majority added for-profit corporations, it should be noted that it
that not all religious objections to specific man- was explicitly shared by only one other justice,
dates, such as immunizations, would necessarily with two justices deciding not to give their
succeed but did not explain why not or provide opinion. She also argued that although the madoctrinal principles that would ensure that im- jority sought to confine its opinion to “closely
munizations remain mandatory. The majority held corporations, its logic extends to corporanoted that religious objections to taxes would not tions of any size, public or private.”2
succeed because this would “lead to chaos”2,16
Likewise, Justice Ginsburg noted that albut did not explain why this government- though the Court tried to confine its reasoning
required payment for taxes does not apply to to 4 of the 20 FDA-approved contraceptives, “the
government-required payments for not providing Court’s reasoning appears to permit commercial
adequate health insurance to your workers.
enterprises . . . to exclude from their group
health plans all forms of contraceptives.” This is
a substantial burden on women, especially those
Religion and Women’s He alth
earning low wages. As Ginsburg noted, but the
Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent for herself majority ignored, an IUD generally costs more
and Justices Stephen Breyer, Kagan, and Soto- than $1,000 when the office visit and insertion
mayor. The gender lineup is instructive: all three procedure are added, an expenditure that is
female justices supported the lawfulness of the “nearly equivalent to a month’s full-time pay for
contraceptive mandate, whereas five of the six workers earning the minimum wage.” Nor are
864
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contraceptives all that the opinion addressed.
Its logic could apply, Justice Ginsburg suggested, to employers with religious objections “to
blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived
from pigs . . . (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists,
among others).”2
Justice Ginsburg also got the best of a core
question: Is the “burden” on the religious beliefs of a corporation’s owners “substantial” if a
female employee uses one of the four religiously
objectionable contraceptives? Ginsburg argued
that there are too many breaks in the link between the corporation owners and the possible
results of the use of contraception by an employee, including actions by the employee, her
physician, and perhaps the pharmacist, to substantially burden the company’s religious beliefs.
For example, it is unlikely that the corporation’s
owners would feel morally responsible if an employee died in childbirth as a result of an unintended pregnancy. Nor was it likely that this
group of owners would feel morally responsible
for any pregnancy-related conditions or deaths
that could have been prevented by use of the four
religiously objectionable birth-control methods.
And why is it a violation of one’s religion to provide health insurance (which everyone concedes
is part of employee compensation) that covers
all 20 contraceptives but not a violation of religion for employees to use their wages to purchase the four contraceptives to which the company has a religious objection?
In the context of making money, rather than
spending it, Hobby Lobby itself apparently has
no religious objection to an intervening agent
making choices that funnel its money to the
makers of contraceptives, including Plan B. Hobby Lobby’s public filings regarding the 401(k)
retirement plan it funds and operates for its employees reveal that a portion of this plan is invested, by fund managers such as Vanguard, in
companies like Teva Pharmaceuticals, the maker
of Plan B.17

allows employers to interfere in women’s health
care decisions . . . [which] should be made by
a woman and her doctor, based on the patient’s
needs and her current health.” ACOG went on to
underline that contraceptives and family planning are mainstream medical care and should
be treated as such. In their words, “access to contraception is essential women’s health care.”18
The Court’s ruling can also be viewed as a
direct consequence of our fragmented health
care system, in which fundamental duties are
incrementally delegated and imposed on a range
of public and private actors. The Court is correct
on one dimension of its opinion: if universal access to contraceptives is a compelling societal
interest, then the provision of such access ought
to fall first and foremost on the national government and only secondarily be transferred to private parties.19 Our systemic reliance on health
insurance that is based on private employment
provokes just this sort of clash between public
and private values.20
Our incremental, fragmented, and incomplete
health insurance system means that different
Americans have different access to health care
on the basis of their income, employment status,
age, and sex. The decision in Hobby Lobby unravels only one more thread, perhaps, but it tugs
on a quilt that is already inequitable and uneven.21 A central goal of the ACA was to repair
some of this incremental fragmentation by universalizing certain basic health care entitlements. In ruling in favor of idiosyncratic religious claims over such universality, the Court
has once again expressed its disagreement with
this foundational health-policy goal.

An interview with
Professor Annas
is available at
NEJM.org

Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with
the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Health Law, Bioethics, and Human
Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston
(G.J.A.); and the University of Pennsylvania School of Law
(T.W.R.) and Perelman School of Medicine and the Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics (J.P.R.) — all in Philadelphia.
This article was published on July 16, 2014, at NEJM.org.
1. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,

132S.Ct. 2566 (2012).

Medic al C are and the AC A

2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Special-

In terms of health care, the reaction of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) to the Court’s opinion seems just
about right to us: “This decision inappropriately

n engl j med 371;9

ties Corporation, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505 (June 30).
3. Mariner WK, Glantz LH, Annas GJ. Reframing federalism
— the Affordable Care Act (and broccoli) in the Supreme Court.
N Engl J Med 2012;367:1154-8.
4. Recommendations. In: Committee on Preventive Services for
Women, Institute of Medicine. Clinical prevention services for

nejm.org

august 28, 2014

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org on October 16, 2014. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2014 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

865

Health Law, Ethics, and Human Rights
women: closing the gap. Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2011:102-10.
5. The court limits Americans’ rights. New York Times. July 1,
2014:A16.
6. Religious liberty affirmed. Wall Street Journal. June 30, 2014:
A12.
7. Annas GJ. Abortion politics and health insurance reform.
N Engl J Med 2009;361:2589-91.
8. Birth control: medicines to help you. Silver Spring, MD: Food
and Drug Administration (http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.htm).
9. Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (CA 10 2013).
10. Mariner WK. Hobby Lobby — Part 2: do religions get their
own facts? HealthLawProfBlog. July 2, 2014 (http://lawprofessors
.typepad.com/healthlawprof_blog/2014/07/guest-blogger
-professor-wendy-mariner-hobby-lobby-part-2-do-religions
-get-their-own-facts.html).
11. U.S. Code, Title 42: The Public Health and Welfare,
Sec.300gg-13, coverage of preventive health services.
12. 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-26.
13. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, 3-5 (Nos. 13-354 and 13-356).

866

n engl j med 371;9

Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, 134 S.Ct. 1022 (2014).
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4706 (July 3).
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Long H. Hobby Lobby does invest in birth control. CNN
Money. July 2, 2014 (http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/01/investing/
hobby-lobby-401k-contraception).
18. ACOG statement on the Supreme Court decision on Hobby
Lobby v. Burwell. Washington, DC: American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, June 30, 2014 (http://www.acog
.org/About-ACOG/News-Room/News-Releases/2014/ACOG
-Statement-on-the-Supreme-Court-Decision-on-Hobby-Lobby
-v-Sebelius).
19. Ruger JP. Health and social justice. Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press, 2009.
20. Cohen IG, Lynch HF, Curfman GD. When religious freedom
clashes with access to care. N Engl J Med 2014;371:596-9.
21. Ruger JP. Fair enough? Inviting inequities in state health
benefits. N Engl J Med 2012;366:681-3.
14.
15.
16.
17.

DOI: 10.1056/NEJMhle1408081
Copyright © 2014 Massachusetts Medical Society.

nejm.org

august 28, 2014

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org on October 16, 2014. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2014 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

